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Paternalism and Psychology 
Edward L. Glaeser† 
Does bounded rationality make paternalism more attractive? This Essay argues that errors will be 
larger when suppliers have stronger incentives or lower costs of persuasion and when consumers have 
weaker incentives to learn the truth. These comparative statics suggest that bounded rationality will 
often increase the costs of government decisionmaking relative to private decisionmaking, because 
consumers have better incentives to overcome errors than government decisionmakers, consumers have 
stronger incentives to choose well when they are purchasing than when they are voting and it is more 
costly to change the beliefs of millions of consumers than a handful of bureaucrats. As such, recognizing 
the limits of human cognition may strengthen the case for limited government.   
INTRODUCTION 
An increasingly large body of evidence documenting bounded ration-
ality and non-standard preferences has led many scholars to question eco-
nomics’ traditional hostility towards paternalism.
1 After all, if individuals 
have so many cognitive difficulties then it is surely possible that govern-
ment intervention can improve welfare. As Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, 
and Richard Thaler write: “bounded rationality pushes toward a sort of anti-
antipaternalism—a skepticism about antipaternalism, but not an affirmative 
defense of paternalism.”
2 Even if these authors stop short of endorsing tra-
ditional hard paternalism, such as sin taxes and prohibitions, Sunstein and 
Thaler are enthusiastic about soft or libertarian paternalism, where the gov-
ernment engages in “debiasing,” changing default rules and other policies 
that will change behavior without limiting choice.
3   
In this Essay, I argue that the flaws in human cognition should make us 
more, not less, wary about trusting government decisionmaking. The debate 
over paternalism must weigh private and public errors. If errors are thought 
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to be exogenous then there is little reason to believe that these errors will be 
greater among public or private decisionmakers, but if psychological errors 
are understood to be endogenous, then there are good reasons why we 
might think that public decisionmaking is likely to be more flawed than 
private decisionmaking. In Part I of this Essay, I review the evidence sup-
porting the view that psychological errors are the endogenous market phe-
nomena that respond to both “demand” and “supply.” On the supply side, 
purveyors of influence have the capacity to change popular opinion. On the 
demand side, human beings have some capacity to limit errors, especially 
with the time and incentives to acquire advice and information.    
In Part II, I present three simple models that show how endogenous 
cognitive errors increase the advantage of private decisionmaking over pub-
lic decisionmaking, which suggest that recognizing the limits of human 
cognition push us away, not towards, paternalism. In these models, as the 
bounds to human rationality increase, the quality of government decision-
making decreases even faster than the quality of private decisionmaking.    
The first model hinges on the fact that consumers face stronger incen-
tives to get things right than government decisionmakers do when making 
decisions about unrelated individuals. In the second model, the supply of 
error comes from a private firm that is trying to increase demand. If the cost 
of persuading one government bureaucrat is less than the cost of persuading 
millions of consumers, then government bureaucrats will be more prone to 
error than private consumers.    
The final model looks at the electoral process and again relies on the 
fact that individuals have stronger incentives when making consumption 
decisions than when taking part in an election to choose a leader who will 
make consumption decisions for them. In this model, there is an advantage 
from public decisionmaking. When information isn’t highly correlated, and 
a majority is better informed than a minority, then the tyranny of the major-
ity can have benefits (these would disappear with enough consumer hetero-
geneity). However, as people become more and more prone to error, the 
tyranny of the majority induces everyone to make the wrong decision.    
These examples are far from definitive. In some cases the governments 
may make better decisions. Still, once errors are seen to be endogenous, the 
lack of incentives in politics and among politicians and the small numbers 
of public decisionmakers suggest that government decisionmaking is likely 
to be particularly erroneous. While there are surely some empirical cases of 
paternalism that have been successful, across a wide range of settings, the 
models’ basic implication of faulty government decisionmaking cannot be 
rejected. Over and over again, paternalism has been abused by governments 
responding to special interests or to seek to aggrandize their own authority.   
In Part III of the Essay, I turn to soft paternalism. While I generally 
share Sunstein and Thaler’s view that soft paternalism is less damaging than 
hard paternalism and that in many cases some form of paternalism is inevi-3  Paternalism and Psychology 
 
 
table, I respectfully disagree with their view that this type of paternalism 
“should be acceptable to even the most ardent libertarian.”
4 Soft paternal-
ism is neither innocuous nor obviously benign.     
If abused by a less than perfect government, soft paternalism can make 
decisions worse just like hard paternalism. As George Loewenstein and Ted 
O’Donoghue argue, soft paternalism towards an activity essentially creates 
a psychic tax on that activity that provides no revenues, which can be much 
worse than hard paternalism.
5 Hard paternalism in the form of tax rates or 
bans is easy to monitor and control; soft paternalism is not. Soft paternalism 
often relies on stigmatizing behavior like smoking, drinking or homosexual-
ity, and this can and has led to dislike or hatred of those individuals who 
continue to engage in the disapproved activities. Moreover, soft paternalism 
will surely increase support for hard paternalism, as it seems to have done 
in the case of cigarettes.        
Finally, persuasion lies at the heart of much of soft paternalism and it 
is not obvious that we want governments to become more adept at persuad-
ing voters or for governments to invest in infrastructure that will support 
persuasion. Governments have a strong incentive to abuse any persuasion-
related infrastructure and use it for their own interests, mostly keeping 
themselves in power. 
In Part V of this Essay, I consider some simple rules for guiding the 
implementation of paternalism and for limiting governmental errors related 
to cognitive limitations. If experience reduces errors then there is a case for 
policy conservatism. The possibility for wild errors in democratic elections 
suggests the value of institutions that provide for “cooling-off.” The ability 
of entrepreneurs to persuade suggests an examination of political (and gov-
ernmental) advertising. Finally, since cognition has more problems with 
complex decisions, there is a case for more single-issue debates or even 
elections.   
I.  THE ENDOGENEITY OF ERROR 
The new case for paternalism is based on two different psychological 
phenomena: bounded rationality and self-control problems. The literature 
on self-control and hyperbolic discounting argues that people would want to 
refrain from certain actions if they only could.
6 The bounded rationality 
                                                                                                                           
  4  Id at 175.  
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literature argues that people face severe cognitive limitations and often 
make bad decisions.
7 
This Essay focuses on paternalism and bounded rationality, because 
bounded rationality is quite common and provides a clearer case for real 
paternalism than self-control problems do.
8 Limits to knowledge and rea-
soning are quite common. Thaler describes a striking number of examples, 
like the Winner’s Curse, that illustrate the human tendency towards forms 
of biases and errors.
9 Opinion polls suggest striking examples of erroneous 
beliefs. For example, according to the World Values Survey, 71 percent of 
Americans and 17 percent of the French believe in the devil.
10 One of these 
groups is wrong.     
Following Bruno Frey and Reiner Eichenberger,
11 I now argue that 
cognitive errors endogenously reflect the actions of suppliers of beliefs and 
the cognitive effort of individuals.      
A.  The Supply of Error   
In the laboratory, there is an enormously rich tradition of showing that 
individuals are extremely subject to social influence, and errors easily result 
for external stimuli. Solomon Asch is a pioneer in this area who shows that 
individuals will report that a shorter line is longer when planted confeder-
ates declare that they think the shorter line is longer.
12 Asch’s basic result 
has been reproduced hundreds of times throughout the globe,
13 and with 
many different types of questions. Opinions can be manipulated by peers.   
Opinions can also be manipulated in other ways. For example, Linda 
Babcock, George Loewenstein and Samuel Issacharoff show that debiasing 
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the availability of technologies or contracts that facilitate private self-control, which cannot really be 
called paternalism because these policies increase, rather than decrease, the choice set.   
  9  See generally Richard H. Thaler, The Winner’s Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies in Economic 
Life (Princeton 1994).  
  10  Edward L. Glaeser, Psychology and the Market, 94 Am Econ Rev 408, 408 (2004).  
  11  See generally Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger, Economic incentives transform psycho-
logical anomalies, 23 J Econ Behav & Org 215 (1994). 
  12 Solomon  E.  Asch,  Social Psychology 451–73 (Prentice-Hall 1952).  There is some debate as to 
whether this result reflects people changing their mind or just saying that they change their mind. Com-
pelling recent evidence suggests that people really do change their mind as a result of this social influ-
ence. See Gregory S. Berns, et al, Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity and Independence 
During Mental Rotation, Biological Psych (forthcoming 2005).  
  13  See generally Rod Bond and Peter B. Smith, Culture and Conformity: A Meta-Analysis of 
Studies using Asch’s (1952b, 1956) Line Judgment Task, 119 Psych Bull 111 (1996). 5  Paternalism and Psychology 
 
 
techniques can be used to eliminate self-serving biases in negotiations.
14 
Gregory Pogarsky and Linda Babcock illustrate anchoring effects in an 
experiment on judgment.
15 Edward McCaffery, Daniel Kahneman and Mat-
thew Spitzer illustrate the power of framing in an experiment meant to rep-
licate jury decisions.
16 More generally, there is widespread agreement in the 
experimental literature that even modest changes in framing can create 
wildly different results.   
Outside of the laboratory, there is also substantial evidence suggesting 
that suppliers are able to manipulate beliefs. In the legal sphere, competent 
attorneys are paid well to change the beliefs of juries. Firms spend large 
amounts of money on advertising and other forms of belief manipulation. 
While some of this manipulation can be seen as correcting errors (that is, 
informing the consumer), not all advertising is strictly informative. In the 
pre-modern era, false advertising was common (touting the miraculous ad-
vantages of patent medicine for example), and presumably firms would not 
have spent on this unless it was having an effect.   
Is there strong evidence that attempts at belief manipulation are suc-
cessful on a large scale outside of the laboratory? Unfortunately, there have 
been few compelling natural experiments, although anecdotes with some 
evidence showing the power of indoctrination are common. For example, 
Bruce Sacerdote and I examine the connection between education and re-
ligiosity across countries.
17 In the former Warsaw Pact countries, where 
attacking religious beliefs was a stated curricular aim, the levels of religious 
belief are extremely low and the negative connection between education 
and religious beliefs is remarkably high.
18 Schools seem to have been able 
to convince students that Christianity is false.    
Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse Shapiro examine the role of the media in 
forming beliefs in the Middle East.
19 There is a remarkable difference of 
opinion across the Islamic world in beliefs about facts surrounding Septem-
ber 11, 2001
20 According to the Pew Research Institute, only 7 percent of 
Americans do not believe that Arab terrorists destroyed the World Trade 
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8080, Jan 2001), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8080. 
  18  Id at 28–29. 
  19  Matthew A. Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro, Media, Education and Anti-Americanism in the 
Muslim World, 18 J Econ Persp 117, 121–28 (2004). 
  20  Gentzkow and Shapiro, 18 J Econ Persp at 117 (cited in note 19) (“[Seventy-eight] percent of 
respondents in seven Muslim countries said that they do not believe that a group of Arabs carried out the 
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Center.  Eighty-nine percent of Kuwaitis believe that Arab terrorists did not 
destroy the World Trade Center.
21 Gentzkow and Shapiro show that, in the 
Middle East, exposure to CNN increases the tendency to think that Arabs 
destroyed the World Trade Center whereas exposure to Al-Jazeera decreases 
the tendency to think that Arabs destroyed the building.
22 Education has a 
weakly positive impact on the belief that Arabs destroyed the building, but 
this effect is reversed if education is primarily Arabic. This evidence sup-
ports the idea that individuals believe, at least in part, what they hear.   
Alberto Alesina and I report that 60 percent of Americans believe that 
the poor are lazy, but only 26 percent of Europeans share that view.
23 By 
contrast, 60 percent of Europeans think that the poor are trapped in poverty, 
but only 29 percent of Americans share that opinion.
24 In reality, the Ameri-
can poor generally work harder than their European counterparts and have a 
lower probability of exiting from poverty.
25 While these differences in be-
liefs do not reflect differences in reality, they do reflect the impact of 100 
years of relatively leftist indoctrination in European schools and relatively 
rightist indoctrination in American schools. Alesina and I provide documen-
tation of the substantive differences in what European children and Ameri-
can children are taught about the nature of poverty.   
If one major source of cognitive errors is the supply of beliefs, then er-
rors will not be random, but they will in part reflect the costs and incentives 
faced by belief suppliers. While the suppliers of beliefs may not be per-
fectly rational, they certainly increase advertising when returns rise and 
decrease it when costs rise. There is abundant evidence on the importance 
of returns in driving advertising expenditures. For example, advertisers 
disproportionately spend to reach high-spending segments of the market. 
The role of costs and benefits for suppliers suggests that we should expect 
more errors when belief suppliers face high returns from moving opinion 
and less error when the costs of manipulating beliefs are high.      
B.  Self-Correction of Errors 
As Frey and Eichenberger emphasize, a second source of endogenous 
error is the effort that consumers can take to correct errors.
26 Human beings 
are not irrational automata and with motivation, they should be able to re-
duce cognitive errors. Vernon Smith and James Walker present a simple 
                                                                                                                           
  21  Id at 120. 
  22  Id at 125 (“Most strikingly, those who watched only Al Jazeera are significantly less likely to 
believe these reports than those who watched neither network.”). 
  23  Alberto Alesina and Edward Glaeser, Fighting Poverty in the U.S. and Europe: A World of 
Difference (Oxford 2004). 
  24  Id at 184. 
  25  Id at 60-68. 
  26  Frey and Eichenberger, 23 J Econ Behav & Org at 223–27 (cited in note 11). 7  Paternalism and Psychology 
 
 
model where costly effort can reduce error and summarize the experimental 
literature on incentives and decisionmaking.
27 They conclude, “[s]ome stud-
ies report observations that fail to support the predictions of rational mod-
els, but as reward level is increased the data shift toward these predic-
tions.”
28    
Amos Tversky and Ward Edwards, for example, show that paying sub-
jects five cents for right answers increases the accuracy of predictions.
29 In 
a variation of the Asch conformity experiment, Robert Baron, Joseph Van-
dello, and Bethany Brunsman show that increasing the stakes decreases 
conformism by 50 percent when the task is easy.
30 Confirming another pre-
diction of the hypothesis that incentives improve accuracy, Smith and 
Walker also show that the variance of outcomes across people declines as 
stakes increase.
31 
The Smith and Walker survey omits many more nuanced elements of 
the relationship between incentives and anomalies; Colin Camerer and 
Robin Hogarth present a more balanced survey that argues “the extreme 
positions, that incentives make no difference at all, or always eliminate per-
sistent irrationalities, are false.”
32 Still, they conclude that “the presence and 
amount of incentive does seem to affect average performance in many 
tasks, particularly judgment tasks.”
33 Perhaps the right view is that there is a 
modest body of experimental evidence suggesting that in many cases errors 
decline as incentives grow stronger.   
But there are many reasons to think that incentive effects will be much 
stronger in the real world than in the laboratory. In experiments, individuals 
have few tools with which to improve their reasoning, and their only real 
method of responding to incentives is to think harder.  Outside of the lab, 
people have access to advisers, books, the internet and more time. Their 
willingness to spend time and money to use these resources will surely de-
pend on the stakes involved in the decision.    
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  31  Smith and Walker, 31 Econ Inquiry at 258 (cited in note 27). 
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Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J of Risk and Uncertainty 7, 8 (1999). 
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Just as the large expenditure on advertising is our best evidence that 
beliefs can be supplied, the existence of substantial industries specializing 
in advice and information suggests that in many contexts people are really 
interested in knowing the truth. For example, 6.8 million people subscribe 
to Consumer Reports,
34 one potential source of information that can undo 
supplier-created biases in consumer spending. There is a large, thriving 
industry of management consultants that provide information to firms and 
self-help books. No one would claim that these resources eliminate all er-
rors, but they do provide tools with which a motivated consumer can reduce 
error.   As John List has shown, a particularly important way in which con-
sumers are able to reduce error is through experience.   
While private decision-makers are often faulty, errors are even more fre-
quent in political markets where the incentives to correct are weak.  In at 
least one opinion poll a majority of respondents in the United States thought 
that Saddam Hussein was personally behind the World Trade Center at-
tacks.
35 Even more strikingly, in a Pew Poll in 1998, 63 percent of respon-
dents thought that the United States spends more on foreign aid than on 
Medicare (only 27 percent gave the right answer).
36 My claim is not that all 
voting decisions are wildly erroneous, but rather that theory predicts that 
errors will be more likely in voting than in private decisions, and that there 
is some evidence that supports this prediction.      
II.  ANTIPATERNALISM AND THE ENDOGENEITY OF ERROR 
Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler argue that “bounded rationality pushes to-
ward a sort of anti-antipaternalism—a skepticism about antipaternalism,”
37 
and that “issues of paternalism are to a significant degree empirical ques-
tions, not questions to be answered on an a priori basis.”
38 On one level this 
claim is unobjectionable. What public policy debate is not ultimately em-
pirical?   
After all there have always existed plenty of grounds, like market fail-
ures and externalities, for government intervention in the economy. Bans on 
alcohol or drugs can be justified on the basis of externalities alone; the at-
tractiveness of these policies has always depended on empirical evaluation 
of the magnitude of these externalities. Many examples of soft paternalism, 
                                                                                                                           
  34 See  2005 Consumers Union Annual Report, online at 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/aboutus/annualreport.htm. 
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such as the Surgeon General’s warning on cigarette packages, can be seen 
as information dissemination and there is always a public-good aspect to 
information. Almost all policies have some justification even without any 
modern insights from psychology, and as soon as any such justification 
exists, then the policy debate is always an “empirical matter.”   
As such, I cannot dispute Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler’s view that pater-
nalistic policies are an empirical matter. I do however dispute the view that 
a richer model of psychology should increase our enthusiasm for govern-
ment intervention. With boundedly rational voters and politicians, democ-
racy is no guarantee against political catastrophe. Moreover, as the three 
models in this Part emphasize, when cognitive errors are in some sense 
endogenous, then economic theory pushes us to think that private decisions 
will often be more accurate than public decisions.   
In these models, I consider a paradigmatic example of paternalism: re-
placing private decisionmaking with decisionmaking by a public decision-
maker. I do not consider any form of mixed decisionmaking, and I ignore 
many subtle ways in which the government can influence private decisions. 
In all three cases, I assume that individuals make mistakes because of erro-
neous beliefs not unusual preferences. I assume standard preference, be-
cause standard preferences provide us with a clear answer about what an 
individual would like to maximize.
39 The point of these models is to ask 
whether private or public decisionmakers are more likely to get things right 
when there are endogenous errors. To the extent that the government makes 
bad decisions, this will compromise all forms of paternalism, even those 
that are libertarian or asymmetric.
40  
The key decision in the model is a binary choice over an activity—
smoking perhaps—that yields benefits B and which carries long run per-
sonal costs, perhaps to health. To allow some scope for paternalism, the true 
cost of this activity is  ε + C , which is greater than B. Individuals only 
know this true cost with probability P. With probability 1 – P, the individ-
ual believes that the cost is only C, where B > C. In all cases, I assume that 
individuals maximize expected utility based on occasionally erroneous be-
liefs. Expected social welfare based on the true costs, which I will treat as 
the welfare criterion, is  ) )( 1 ( ε − − − C B P . 
A paternalistic policy takes the form of allowing a governmental deci-
sionmaker to decide whether everyone undertakes the activity or not. Since 
I assume that everyone faces the same costs and benefits, there are none of 
                                                                                                                           
  39  In the case of hyperbolic discounting, government actions that restrict behavior at some future 
date might appeal to the individual at the initial time period, and might appeal to the individual at the 
end of his life, but any such restrictions will at the very least disadvantage the person at the point that his 
decisionmaking is being restricted.   
  40  See, for example, Colin Camerer, et al, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics 
and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism”, 151 U Pa L Rev 1211 (2003). 10  Paternalism and Psychology 
the usual losses from imposing uniform choices on heterogeneous individu-
als. These losses will generally increase the advantages of private deci-
sionmaking.   
With probability π  the government agent knows the true cost of the 
activity and with probability  π − 1 , the government believes that the cost is 
C. Governmental decisionmaking increases welfare if and only if  P > π , 
and indeed without further information, it would be impossible to know on 
theoretical grounds whether private or public decisionmaking is better. But 
when the probability of error is endogenous, theoretical predictions lose 
their neutrality and theory begins to suggest that private decisionmaking 
will be less erroneous than public decisionmaking.   
Model # 1:  Consumers face stronger incentives to correct errors that 
directly impact their well-being than do government bureaucrats.  
This first argument assumes that P and π  are the result of information 
acquisition or other actions meant to reduce error. Both the private individ-
ual and the governmental decisionmaker have access to a technology which 
determines the probability with which the individual knows the true cost of 
the action. The private individual can pay a cost K(P) and the public deci-
sionmaker can pay a cost  ) (π K  to increase the probability that they know 
the truth. The cost of information is increasing and convex and the problem 
has an interior solution. I assume that before investing in the information 
acquisition, both private and public individuals believe that the true cost of 
the action is  ε + C  with probability one-half and  ε − C  with probability 
one-half. The real cost continues to be  ε + C . Given these assumptions, the 
private decisionmaker will invest to the point where 
) ( 5 . ) ( B C P K − + = ′ ε . 
In the case of a governmental decisionmaker, the problem is symmet-
ric except that the government decisionmaker does not care as much about 
the individual’s well-being as the individual himself does. The government 
decisionmaker invests in knowledge to maximize β  times individual wel-
fare minus the costs of cognition, where  1 < β . While government bureau-
crats may be strongly altruistic, few advocates of paternalism would really 
argue that a government decisionmaker would be willing to pay the same 
personal costs to make a citizen’s life better as that citizen himself would. 
With this assumption the government will set  ) ( 5 . ) ( B C K − + = ′ ε β π , 
and the government will be less likely to learn the truth than the private 
decisionmaker.   
One natural measure of the degree of limited cognition is the size of 
ε , which captures the degree to which people’s beliefs about costs differ 
from the true beliefs about costs. As ε  increases, the accuracy of private 
decisionmaking relative to public decisionmaking, or  π − P , will increase 
as long as  ) ( ) ( P K K ′ ′ > ′ ′ β π , which will always hold if  (.) K ′ ′ ′ isn’t over-
whelmingly positive or if the distance between P and π  isn’t too great. The 
private response to an increasing possibility of extreme error will be greater 11  Paternalism and Psychology 
 
 
than the public response to that error because the private individual’s wel-
fare is more directly tied to the magnitude of mistakes.    
Obviously, this model is a simplification; there are many factors that 
could reverse the results. The government might have access to better learn-
ing technologies and there might be returns to scale in learning. If govern-
mental information acquisition was spread over enough consumers, this 
would represent a real advantage, albeit one coming from the well-accepted 
public-good aspect of information, not from paternalism per se. Still, the 
existence of better incentives at the private level does suggest one advan-
tage of private decisionmaking in the face of endogenous error and that the 
magnitude of this advantage may increase as the degree of error rises.   
Model # 2:  If error comes from the influence of firms or other inter-
ested parties, and if it is cheaper to persuade a small number of bureaucrats 
than a vast number of consumers, then government decisionmaking will be 
particularly flawed.   
Now, I assume that the size of errors is not a function of individual ef-
fort but rather of the effort of firms to spread error. I assume that there is a 
firm that receives benefit J for each individual who undertakes the activity 
and there are N individuals in the market whose decisions are either private 
or made by a bureaucrat. To model the endogeneity of error, I assume that 
the firm can pay to increase the amount of error, that is, 1 – P or  π − 1 . The 
critical assumption is that the cost of persuasion is also increasing in the 
number of people who are to be persuaded.   
The assumption that it is cheaper to sway a limited number of gov-
ernmental decisionmakers than it is to move the beliefs of millions is sup-
ported by the much greater magnitude of spending on consumer advertising 
relative to political spending. For example, the Federal Election Commis-
sion reports that total funds raised during the 2004 election for both houses 
of Congress and the presidency came to slightly under $2 billion.
41 The 
Center for Responsive Politics reports that total lobbyist spending in 2000 
was $1.03 billion.
42   
As large as these numbers may be, they are dwarfed by consumer 
spending. Indeed, Advertising Age reports thirty companies alone spent 
more than $1.555 billion on consumer advertising in 2004, and ten compa-
nies had advertising budgets bigger than all spending on the 2004 cam-
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paign.
43 The health sector as a whole spent $209 million on lobbying in 
2000, but Pfizer spent $2.96 billion on advertising last year and Johnson 
and Johnson spent $2.17 billion.
44 These numbers reflect only spending, not 
the marginal cost of changing opinions, but the much greater spending on 
consumer advertising supports the idea that it is more expensive to move 
millions of consumers than a small number of politicians.   
I model this assumption by assuming that cost of persuading N people 
equals  ) 1 ( ) ( P h N g −  and the cost of persuading one bureaucrat equals 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( π − h g . Both functions g(.) and h(.) are increasing, and the function 
h(.) is, again, convex. In the case of private decisionmaking, the firm sets 
) 1 ( ) ( P h N g NJ − ′ = . As long as  ) ( / ) ( N g N N g ′ >  (which would be 
true if 
α gN N g = ) (  with  1 < α  for example) then the amount of persua-
sion increases with the size of the market. In the case of public decision-
making the firm sets  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( π − ′ = h g NJ . Convexity ensures that  π > P . 
The higher costs involved in persuading large numbers of consumers im-
plies that the amount of error will be lower.   
As  ε  rises, the gains from private decisionmaking increase because 
private decisionmakers are less likely to err, and this accuracy is worth 
more if ε  increases. If 
α gN N g = ) (  then decreases in g represent greater 
bounds on consumer rationality, because as g falls, it is easier to persuade 
people of falsehoods. The relative accuracy of private decisionmaking will 
increase as g falls as long as  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( π
α − ′ ′ > − ′ ′ h P h N , which will always 
hold if P and π  are close or if  0 (.) ≤ ′ ′ ′ h . As g falls, the difference in error 
between the government decisionmaker and the private decisionmaker will 
increase, which suggests that the relative costs of governmental decision-
making increase as the limits to rationality increase.     
One caveat to this argument is that in a divided system of government, 
imposing paternalistic policies requires the approval of a number of differ-
ent decisionmakers (the courts, the legislature, the executive). Divided gov-
ernment will tend to increase the costs of influence and reduce the errors 
from government decisionmaking, and the fans of divided government well 
understand this advantage.   
Model # 3: Consumers have more incentives when making private de-
cisions than they do when voting. 
I now compare private decisionmaking and information acquisition to 
voting in an election. Private decisionmaking is the same as in Model # 1. 
Public decisionmaking is determined by an election, where there are two 
candidates who do not engage in information acquisition, but rather just run 
for office. One candidate thinks that costs are greater than B and the other 
                                                                                                                           
  43 50th  Annual  100 Leading National Advertisers, 76 Advertising Age June 27, 2005 & Supp), 
online at http://www.adage.com/images/random/lna2005.pdf.  
  44  Id at 6. 13  Paternalism and Psychology 
 
 
of whom thinks that costs are less than B. The elected candidate will im-
plement the policy (allow the activity or don’t) that corresponds with these 
beliefs.   
There are a large number of individuals, again initially believing that 
the true cost of the activity is either  ε − C  or  ε + C , each with probability 
one-half. In a paternalistic society where the government will make the 
decision, an individual will only improve his decisionmaking to the extent 
that he believes that his vote will influence the election. I let q denote any 
individual’s belief that his vote will decide the election. While the model 
certainly allows for the possibility that people overestimate the probability 
that their vote will decide the election, I will assume that q is a small num-
ber that is closer to zero than to one.   
The expected return from investing in information is zero if the indi-
vidual isn’t the median voter, and the benefits are the same as they would 
be if the individual is making his own private decision if that person is the 
median voter. Therefore, the individual will invest in information up to the 
point where  ) ( 5 . ) ( B C q P K − + = ′ ε . This first-order condition can be 
compared with  ) ( 5 . ) ( B C P K − + = ′ ε , which is the first-order condition 
in the case of private decisionmaking. Even if an individual thinks that he 
or she has a 5 percent chance of influencing the election, which would rep-
resent a wild amount of error in most elections, the incentive to invest in the 
electoral setting is one-twentieth the incentive to invest in the private set-
ting. As such, the quality of decisionmaking should be much lower when 
people are casting ballots than when they are buying commodities.    
The degree of error depends on the correlation of information signals 
across people. If information signals are perfectly correlated so that if eve-
ryone invests the same amount in knowledge, then either everyone learns 
the truth or no one learns the truth, and private decisionmaking is always 
worse than election-based decisionmaking. If information signals are inde-
pendent, then there is at least one potential advantage from electoral deci-
sionmaking: the tyranny of a well-informed majority. If information is in-
dependent—P > 0.5—then enforcing uniformity will have positive effect, 
because the median voter will vote for the right policy and this will ensure 
that everyone follows this policy. Naturally, this discussion omits the costs 
of enforcing uniformity on a population with heterogeneous preferences, 
which would generate more costs from paternalism.     
Of course, with independent information, when P is less than one-half, 
enforcing uniformity will ensure that everyone does the wrong thing. As q 
goes to zero, this will ensure the wrong decision for everyone all of the 
time. Again, as the limits to rationality rise, the disadvantages of govern-
ment decisionmaking increase. As above, reducing incentives for undoing 
biases is more costly when these biases are bigger. The one advantage of 
government decisionmaking—enforcing the wise majority’s views on the 14  Paternalism and Psychology 
foolish minority—disappears as psychological errors grow and the majority 
itself is likely to be misinformed.   
Further Observations: The preceding three arguments gave three set-
tings where it is clear that errors should be greater when the state makes 
decisions than when private individuals make decisions. This tendency ap-
pears to increase when psychological problems increase. There are other 
factors that support this view. Because elections are complex events that 
combine a host of different issues, individuals should be expected to have 
more problems eliminating psychological errors. It should also be cheaper 
to influence an election than to change the minds of consumers, because the 
complexities of an election probably make it easier to confuse voters. Elec-
tions do not always deliver candidates that are bad for voters, but there is 
certainly every reason to believe that errors in a complicated electoral situa-
tion without incentives will be worse than decisionmaking in a setting 
where incentives are much stronger.   
The previous arguments suggest that there are sound theoretical rea-
sons for believing that paternalistic governmental decisionmaking will gen-
erally lead to bad outcomes. Is this implication wildly at odds with the evi-
dence? Have paternalistic innovations generally been great successes? Pa-
ternalism does seem to have had successes. For example, the 50 percent 
reduction in cigarette smoking per capita since the Surgeon General’s warn-
ing in 1965 can be seen as a successful paternalistic intervention (especially 
of the softer kind).    
But the fight against cigarettes must be put in the context of the other 
significant paternalistic crusades both in the United States and elsewhere. 
Paternalism has been used to justify government actions and rhetoric to-
wards alcohol, drugs, homosexuality, religion-related activity, slavery and 
even loyalty to the government itself. The nineteenth century crusade 
against alcohol brought prohibition, which appears to have had only a mod-
est impact on alcohol abuse while supporting a large, violent underground 
alcohol-based economy.
45 The fight against other drugs is more defensible, 
but the advocates of marijuana legalization argue that the costs of this gov-
ernment policy far exceed the benefits. Governments have attacked homo-
sexuality for centuries and often used paternalistic rhetoric for doing so.   
The track record of American pro-religion paternalism is generally free 
of the religious genocide that has shown elsewhere, but it is still disturb-
ingly full of odd restrictions on behavior, intolerance between religious 
groups and even violent outbursts. Slavery itself was frequently defended 
by Southern apologists as a paternalistic institution needed to protect Afri-
can-Americans from the harsh realities of the market place: “southerners 
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from social theorists to divines to politicians to ordinary slaveholders and 
yeomen, insisted fiercely that emancipation would cast blacks into a mar-
ketplace in which they could not compete and would condemn them to the 
fate of the Indians or worse.”
46   
Most disturbingly, governments are often persuaded that service to 
themselves is indeed the highest of callings, and as a result for paternalistic 
reasons people should be induced to serve and be loyal to the government. 
In the United States, this form of paternalism has been pretty benign at least 
by world standards (pledges of allegiance, jailing critics of World War I). 
Places with fewer checks and balances, like Nazi Germany or Soviet Rus-
sia, turned to paternalistically justified pro-state policies with awful results. 
Some paternalistic policies have had positive benefits, but much of the 
time, paternalism has been pretty harmful. Social welfare may be well-
served by a general bias against paternalistic interventions.  
III.  AGAINST SOFT PATERNALISM 
In the previous Part, I questioned the view that psychology should 
make us more confident about paternalistic governments. In this Part, I spe-
cifically question the use of “soft paternalism,” which I will take to mean 
government policies that change behavior without actually changing the 
choice sets of consumers. Typical examples of soft or libertarian paternal-
ism include “debiasing” campaigns, default rules and other interventions 
which change beliefs and attitude without impacting formal prices faced by 
consumers. While there are many differences across these forms of inter-
vention, I do not have the space to treat them separately, and I will focus on 
the forms of soft paternalism that change beliefs.    
In this Part, I review seven arguments against soft paternalism. I do 
not mean these arguments to suggest that soft paternalism is worse than 
hard paternalism, although this is certainly possible. I also do not mean 
these arguments to suggest that soft paternalism is always wrong. I certainly 
accept that view that in many cases some form of paternalism will be inevi-
table.  Because soft paternalism is both unstoppable and occasionally use-
ful, the relevant policy question is whether soft paternalism should be gen-
erally encouraged or generally discouraged, not whether soft paternalism 
should be banned altogether. The point of the following arguments is that 
there are many reasons to suspect that soft paternalism can be quite harm-
ful, and that academics should not blindly rush to endorse soft paternalism 
as a tool.  
Argument # 1: Soft paternalism is an emotional tax on behavior which 
yields no government revenues. 
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Many examples of soft paternalism make people think that a particular 
behavior is particularly harmful. As Loewenstein and O’Donoghue empha-
size, creating an impression of danger is quite similar to a tax.
47 It will 
hopefully lower the amount of the activity, and decrease the enjoyment of 
those who continue the activity. Government “education” programs about 
cigarettes or safe sex have the result of convincing people that smoking or 
unsafe sex are dangerous, which presumably lowers the enjoyment of those 
who continue to smoke or engage in unsafe sex.
48 The Surgeon General’s 
warning has acted to stigmatize smoking, and as Loewenstein and 
O’Donoghue argue, similar campaigns against obesity have the effect of 
turning eating into an exercise that produces shame and guilt.
49 
These forms of soft paternalism can be seen as non-revenue increasing 
taxes. They make behavior seem unattractive and reduce the utility levels of 
those who continue to use the product. While sin taxes produce revenues 
for the government, among those whose behavior is unchanged, soft pater-
nalism creates pure utility losses with no offsetting transfer to the govern-
ment. For this reason, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue are surely correct that 
even if government chooses its soft paternalism policies perfectly, they will 
still involve deadweight losses that can easily be larger than the losses from 
standard hard paternalism.   
Argument # 2: Soft paternalism can cause bad decisions just as easily 
as hard paternalism. 
The first argument against soft paternalism is that if soft paternalism 
can impact behavior (and I have no doubt that it can) then this has just as 
much possibility of creating social losses as traditional hard paternalism. 
After all, government education programs will change behavior, just like 
taxes. These education programs seem to have just as much possibility of 
being erroneously calibrated, and therefore causing inappropriate decisions, 
as sin taxes. Libertarian paternalism is attractive to people who value free-
dom as an object in and of itself, but it should not be particularly attractive 
to people who think that the big problem with hard paternalism is govern-
ment error. There are many reasons to think that government decisionmak-
ing involves considerable error and standard economic analysis tells us that 
these errors will be just as costly to social welfare with soft paternalism as 
they would be with hard paternalism. 
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Argument # 3: Public monitoring of soft paternalism is much more dif-
ficult than public monitoring of hard paternalism. 
Hard paternalism generally involves measurable instruments. The pub-
lic can all observe the size of sin taxes and voters can tell that certain activi-
ties have been outlawed. Rules can be set in advance about how far gov-
ernments can go in pursuing their policies of hard paternalism. Effective 
soft paternalism must be situation specific and creative in the language of 
its message. This fact makes soft paternalism intrinsically difficult to con-
trol and means that it is, at least on these grounds, more subject to abuse 
than hard paternalism. It is hard to limit soft paternalism because it is so 
difficult to determine whether a politician or public statement violated lin-
guistic boundaries.    
One recent example of this phenomenon is the debate over gay mar-
riage and the “sanctity” of traditional marriage. According to recent polls, 
53 percent of Americans believe that homosexuality is wrong and less than 
50 percent believe that homosexuality is an acceptable alternative life-
style.
50 Given that emotions about homosexuality appear to be stronger than 
emotions about 401(k) plans, homosexuality is one of the most popular 
targets for soft paternalism. The debate about same-sex marriage may be 
partially about policies with real effects towards homosexual unions, but it 
is at least as much an example of soft paternalism. Opponents of same-sex 
marriage want to deprive gays and lesbians of the word “marriage,” which 
is seen as giving societal sanction to homosexual unions. By contrast, the 
supporters of gay marriage want to end the long standing soft paternalism 
that stigmatizes homosexuality.   
Surrounding this debate over gay marriage is a steady barrage of lan-
guage against homosexuality that is itself a form of soft paternalism. It is 
difficult to set rules that would control this language and it is even a matter 
of debate whether some political speeches are actually hostile to gays. It 
would be much easier to discuss the appropriate size of a tax on homosex-
ual marriage than to determine the rules that should restrict political lan-
guage on traditional marriages.   
Argument # 4: While hard paternalism will be limited by public oppo-
sition, soft paternalism is particularly attractive because it builds public 
support. 
A natural check on hard paternalism is the opposition of those who 
regularly engage in a taxed or regulated behavior. Cigarette smokers gener-
ally oppose politicians who favor tobacco regulations and drinkers were 
eager to get rid of prohibition. Any politician who favors hard paternalism 
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must weigh the perceived benefits of these policies against the cost of 
alienating this potentially large group of voters. 
By contrast, soft paternalism—if effective—will build support for the 
politician who opposes the targeted activity. Even soft paternalism that cre-
ates too much fear against an activity will increase the popularity of a 
leader if that leader is strongly identified with the fight against this particu-
lar behavior.
51 As a result, we should expect more abuse of soft paternalism 
than hard paternalism.    
Argument # 5: Soft paternalism can build dislike or even hatred of 
subgroups of the population.   
The previous arguments focused on the reasons why soft paternalism 
is likely to be abused. This argument focuses on an unfortunate side effect 
of soft paternalism: building dislike and even hatred within the population. 
Much of the most effective soft paternalism involves broadcasting the mes-
sage that a given behavior is bad or reflects self-destructive weakness. Indi-
viduals who don’t engage in this behavior and who are exposed to these 
messages will come to think that people who do engage in this behavior are 
unattractive human beings. This will create societal divisions and possibly 
lead people who engage in this behavior to become increasingly uncomfort-
able in social situations.   
There are many examples of this dynamic. Public campaigns against 
smoking have led many people to think that smoking is a self-destructive 
habit and that these people are weak and probably insensitive to those 
around them. Public campaigns about recycling and environmentalism have 
led many people to see the failure to recycle as a moral failing appropriately 
treated with moral opprobrium. The costs that smokers and non-recyclers 
face are real and potentially quite costly. 
A particularly striking example of this occurs in the welfare context. 
For decades, right wing politicians have tried to stigmatize welfare recipi-
ents, particularly with stories about welfare cheats (like Reagan’s welfare 
queen).
52 These stories were certainly justifiable as a form of soft paternal-
ism, inducing people to want to work by stigmatizing government handouts. 
Is it obvious that making the more fortunate members of society think that 
the destitute are morally deficient is good policy?  
Argument # 6:  Soft paternalism leads to hard paternalism. 
By its nature, soft paternalism builds support for hard paternalism. 
Successful soft paternalism will tend to create social dislike for the activity 
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in question, and reduce the number of people who engage in the activity. 
Both of these factors will mean that hard paternalism becomes an increas-
ingly attractive option to the electorate (or to courts). In any reasonable 
political economy model, changing beliefs in a way that convinces voters 
that a behavior is socially harmful will eventually lead to public support for 
more regulation.        
The modern history of cigarette regulation shows this dynamic in ac-
tion. The first major government policy towards cigarettes was a classic 
example of soft paternalism. The Surgeon General’s Report in 1964 simply 
warned, “cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance in 
the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action.”
53 At this point in 
time, remedial action meant soft paternalism and in both 1965 and 1969, 
Congress passed laws which required health warnings on cigarette packages 
in advertising.
54  
The Surgeon General’s warning was associated with a remarkable 
turnaround in cigarette consumption which had been rising steadily over the
 
twentieth century. In 1963, Americans on average smoked 2,772 cigarettes, 
or 7.6 cigarettes per day. In 2004, annual average cigarette consumption had 
fallen to 1,326 or 3.6 cigarettes per day.
55 While it would be foolish to at-
tribute this entire decline to soft paternalism, it is also true that beliefs about 
the harmfulness of cigarettes have changed over time
56 and that across 
countries there is a negative correlation between beliefs about smoking and 
smoking prevalence.
57   
During the initial period of declining cigarette consumption following 
the Surgeon General’s warning there was little change in the taxation of 
tobacco and certainly the most natural interpretation of the reversal of the 
trend in cigarette consumption is that soft paternalism worked. However, 
the change in beliefs about smoking was also accompanied by an increased 
desire to regulate and tax cigarettes.
58 Over time, in response to these popu-
lar beliefs, the courts and legislatures have increasingly taxed, fined and 
regulated cigarette consumption. This pattern is not unique to cigarettes. 
The road to prohibition of alcohol also began with advocates of soft pater-
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nalism who tried to change societal norms rather than banning alcohol by 
law.   
Argument # 7:  Soft paternalism complements other government per-
suasion.   
Soft paternalism requires a government bureaucracy that is skilled in 
manipulating beliefs. A persuasive government bureaucracy is inherently 
dangerous because that apparatus can be used in contexts far away from the 
initial paternalistic domain. Political leaders have a number of goals, only 
some of which relate to improving individual well-being. Investing in the 
tools of persuasion enables the government to change perceptions of many 
things, not only the behavior in question. There is great potential for abuse.  
As a hypothetical example, consider Daniel Benjamin and David Laib-
son’s recommendation that soft paternalism be used to increase savings.
59 
Assume that soft paternalism involved a public education campaign to in-
duce people to think more about the future and make people aware that 
their own rosy scenarios will not necessarily occur. As Benjamin and Laib-
son suggest, from the point of view of fighting self-control problems, such a 
campaign might indeed have beneficial results.
60  
But this public education campaign also offers many degrees of free-
dom that can be used in other, less benign ways. Perhaps the soft paternal-
ism campaign would warn of inflation, and might suggest that other, less 
careful political leaders (that is, the opposition party) might print money 
and devalue nominal dollars. Perhaps the soft paternalism campaign might 
suggest that the stock market might fall, especially if non-business friendly 
leaders were elected. Perhaps the government might suggest that investing 
abroad is particularly perilous, given the unreliability of other countries 
(especially, say, France). All of these messages might be justifiable, but 
would also be pernicious.   
While this example may seem extreme, recent public relations spend-
ing by the Department of Education for the No Child Left Behind Act 
ended up paying a columnist, Armstrong Williams, who regularly promoted 
both the devotion of both the President and the Secretary of Education Rod 
Paige to improving the quality of education for America’s children. The 
commotion surrounding this expenditure should remind us that the ability 
of incumbents to ensure victory through the powers of office, which include 
the bully pulpit, is a constant risk in democracy. Advocating soft paternal-
ism is akin to advocating an increased role of the incumbent government as 
an agent of persuasion. Given how attractive it is to use persuasion for po-
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litical advantage, an increased investment in soft paternalism seems to carry 
great risks.   
CONCLUSION 
I will end this Essay by acknowledging that paternalism is here to stay 
and suggesting a few rules motivated by psychology for guiding paternal-
ism and perhaps paternalism more generally. First, restricting paternalistic 
activities to areas, like particularly dangerous drugs or suicide, where there 
is strong evidence of self-harm, will minimize welfare-reducing policies. 
Second, given the value of experience in checking cognitive errors, sticking 
close to existing policies (conservatism) seems likely to reduce errors. Vot-
ers should be better at evaluating a new policy if it closely resembles poli-
cies that have been tried in the past. The same argument suggests that small 
scale experimentation is helpful, and federalism continues to have value in 
allowing for laboratories of democracy.   
Another principle derived from psychology is that since beliefs, par-
ticularly political beliefs, are so prone to error, limits on direct democracy 
may increase social welfare. Institutions, like the Supreme Court and the 
Senate, which create cooling-off periods that allow for debate that is not 
tied to a general election may reduce errors of policy. Separation of powers, 
which require the suppliers of influence to convince a number of different 
governmental actors, may decrease the amount of public error. Simple de-
bates, such as those surrounding single issue referenda, may also reduce 
errors.    
Given that errors are greatly exacerbated by the suppliers of bias, 
situations with strongly interested parties who are likely to skew beliefs, are 
particularly dangerous. Free entry in the battle of ideas is a helpful check on 
this, but if one side has much more capacity of ability than the others, free 
entry may not be enough. Rules that prevent interventions (soft or hard) in 
areas where there are potential providers of bias that have extremely strong 
incentives, may reduce supplier-created bias.    